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Conﬁdence and psychosis: a neuro-computational account of
contingency learning disruption by NMDA blockade
F Vinckier1,2,3,12, R Gaillard1,4,5,12, S Palminteri6,7, L Rigoux2,3, A Salvador1,5, A Fornito8, R Adapa9,10, MO Krebs1,5, M Pessiglione2,3,13 and
PC Fletcher4,11,13
A state of pathological uncertainty about environmental regularities might represent a key step in the pathway to psychotic illness.
Early psychosis can be investigated in healthy volunteers under ketamine, an NMDA receptor antagonist. Here, we explored the
effects of ketamine on contingency learning using a placebo-controlled, double-blind, crossover design. During functional
magnetic resonance imaging, participants performed an instrumental learning task, in which cue-outcome contingencies were
probabilistic and reversed between blocks. Bayesian model comparison indicated that in such an unstable environment,
reinforcement learning parameters are downregulated depending on conﬁdence level, an adaptive mechanism that was
speciﬁcally disrupted by ketamine administration. Drug effects were underpinned by altered neural activity in a fronto-parietal
network, which reﬂected the conﬁdence-based shift to exploitation of learned contingencies. Our ﬁndings suggest that an early
characteristic of psychosis lies in a persistent doubt that undermines the stabilization of behavioral policy resulting in a failure to
exploit regularities in the environment.
Molecular Psychiatry advance online publication, 9 June 2015; doi:10.1038/mp.2015.73
INTRODUCTION
One of the big challenges facing psychiatry is to develop an
understanding of psychotic symptoms that goes beyond clinical
description to uncover underlying computational and neurobiolo-
gical mechanisms. A comprehensive account of the bizarre
perceptions (hallucinations) and beliefs (delusions) that charac-
terizes psychotic illness would require a mechanistic understanding
of how the brain extracts and exploits regularities in the succession
of events that occur in its environment. Reinforcement learning
theory shows promise in this regard, by offering a framework within
which we can consider causative disturbances at both the
computational and neurobiological levels.1–3 Such perspectives
might therefore give us the sort of mechanistic understanding that
can ultimately shape diagnostic and therapeutic questions.
Insights derived from reinforcement learning models have
already proven useful in developing theoretical accounts of how
psychotic experiences may arise and how they may relate to
disrupted brain processes. Previous empirical studies have focused
on how prediction error signaling may be deranged in
psychosis.4–8 Extending this several authors have suggested that
the key deﬁcit may reside not in prediction error per se, but rather
in how prediction errors are used to update representations of the
environment.9,10 Of relevance, probabilistic learning tasks have
been widely studied in schizophrenia (see refs. 11–13 for reviews),
providing evidence for a complex pattern of deﬁcit depending on
the precise nature of the task (for example, complexity, occurrence
and number of contingency reversals, explicit vs implicit learning)
as well as of the proﬁle of recruited patients (for example,
predominantly positive vs negative symptoms, treated vs
untreated patients). Interestingly, it has been proposed that the
core impairment in schizophrenia might not affect learning ability
per se, but rather the ﬂexible control required to perform complex
tasks and/or the capacity to optimize behavior in order to
maintain a high level of performance.11 In line with such
proposals, our hypothesis is that a key feature of early psychosis
is a disruption in how conﬁdence is updated and used to drive
behavior in a dynamic environment.
In situations of low conﬁdence (or elevated uncertainty),
individuals may seek explanations, exploring various possibilities in
an effort to identify regularities. Indeed, it has been demonstrated
that in such situations, healthy subjects tend to perceive illusory
patterns, creating regularities where there are none, and providing
superstitious or conspiratorial explanations for ambiguous sce-
narios.14 These observations resemble the early features of psychosis,
including sense of change and feeling of strangeness,15–17 search for
explanation,18,19 apophenia20 and jumping to conclusions.21,22
Here, we sought to capture this transitory state in the context of
an associative learning task implementing a dynamic environment.
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We predicted that, during learning of environmental contingencies,
lack of conﬁdence could lead to a reduced ability to stabilize an
internal model of the world, with an ensuing, persistent sense of
surprise. This would eventually result in sub-optimal behavior,
characterized by an under-exploitation of true environmental
regularities and an accompanying tendency to over-readily update
in response to incidental violations of those regularities
Testing our predictions in a clinical setting is challenging given
that, by the time psychosis is clearly identiﬁed, the expression of
altered conﬁdence may have been obfuscated by delusion forma-
tion and treatment effects. An established and fruitful solution is to
use pharmacological models of early psychosis in healthy volun-
teers such as ketamine, a noncompetitive N-methyl-D-aspartate
(NMDA) receptor antagonist23,24 that induces subtle dissociative
symptoms,25 perceptual learning alterations and, critically, psychosis-
like experiences (see26 for a review). Here, we examined placebo-
controlled, within-subject effects of a single dose of ketamine.
The task was adapted from previous paradigms.27,28 On each trial,
participants made a decision in response to a visual cue. The two
options were always betting £1 versus betting 10p. The two options
thus differed in risk, deﬁned as the variance of possible outcomes.
This does not imply that probability of winning was known, since it
had to be learned by trial and error. This probability was 80% given
one (positive) cue and 20% for the other (negative) cue. The optimal
policy was to select the risky option following the positive cue and
the safer option following the negative cue. To introduce instability
into the environment, contingencies were reversed three times,
such that the positive cue became the negative one and vice-versa.
This task is close to tasks previously used to examine model learning
under volatility (as in Behrens et al.29), except that transitions in
probabilistic contingencies were not smooth but rather abrupt, as
we wanted subjects to experience large variations in conﬁdence,
from the beginning to the end of learning blocks.
The key challenge posed to participants by our task was to
notice unexpected outcomes that signaled a change in con-
tingencies while ignoring those related to the probabilistic nature
of these contingencies. Ignoring probabilistic errors requires
conﬁdence in the estimates of experimental regularities. Thus,
we hypothesized that ketamine would prevent subjects from
ignoring probabilistic errors, leading to sub-optimal behavior at
the end of learning blocks, where subjects under placebo would
fully exploit the learned contingencies. We explored the neural
underpinnings of this ketamine-induced dysfunction, with the
prediction that activity in conﬁdence-related brain areas would
show altered dynamics during the course of learning. Neural
responses were concurrently tracked using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), while subjects performed the probabil-
istic contingency learning task. Each participant underwent this
procedure during both ketamine and placebo infusions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-one healthy, right-handed volunteers (11 males), aged 25–37 years
(mean 28.7, s.d. 3.2), were recruited from the local community by
advertisement, and screened using an initial telephone interview and
subsequent personal interview. Exclusion criteria were: personal/familial
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, MRI contra-indications,
illicit substance use in the last 12 months or any lifetime substance misuse
syndrome or alcoholism, history of cardiac illness or high blood pressure,
weight 410% above ideal body mass index. The study was approved by
the Cambridge Local Research Ethics Committee, Cambridge, England, and
was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Written
informed consent was given by all of the subjects.
Ketamine infusion
Racemic ketamine (2mgml−1) was administered intravenously by initial
bolus and subsequent continuous target-controlled infusion using a
computerized pump (Graseby 3500; Graseby Medical, Watford, UK) to
achieve plasma concentrations of 100 ngml−1 using the pharmacokinetic
parameters of a three-compartment model.30 One blood sample was drawn
prior to the fMRI scan. Blood sample was placed on ice, plasma obtained by
centrifugation and plasma samples stored at − 70 oC. Plasma ketamine
concentration was measured by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry.
Experimental design
A double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized, within-subjects design
was used (see Figure 1a). At each visit, after starting the infusion of saline
or low-dose ketamine, subjects underwent a clinical rating of positive
psychotic symptoms as assessed by the Rating Scale for Psychotic
Symptoms.31 Seven key items on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale32
representing symptoms of the psychosis prodrome (somatic concerns,
Figure 1. Experimental design. (a) A double-blind, placebo-con-
trolled, randomized, within-subject design was used. The order of
drug and placebo visits was counterbalanced across subjects and
spaced by at least 1 week. (b) A typical trial and possible outcomes
for a positive cue. Probabilistic contingencies (80 and 20%) would be
swapped for a negative cue. (c) Percentage of risky responses as a
function of trial number (both placebo and ketamine sessions were
pooled). The green (respectively, blue) curve represents the choices
following the cue that was positive (respectively, negative) in the
ﬁrst block. Bold lines represent means; color-delimited areas repre-
sent inter-subject s.e.m (corrected for the variance across subject:
the grand mean of each subject was removed from its data before
computing sem). Vertical dashed lines indicate reversals.
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anxiety-depression, elevated mood, grandiosity, hallucination and unusual
thought content) were also assessed. Dissociative symptoms were
assessed by the Clinician Administered Dissociative States Scale.33 Subjects
then performed the probabilistic learning task in the fMRI scanner.
Subjects also performed two other cognitive tasks while in the fMRI
scanner. These were perceptual tasks not related to the current task and
will not be reported here. Resting state data were also acquired.34
Behavioral task
The task (see Figure 1) required participants, on each trial, to make a choice
between a more and less risky option, indicating their choice by pressing a
key or not. Risk taking was orthogonalized with respect to the motor
dimension, so that pressing the key was assigned to the risky response only
for half of participants and to the less risky response for the other half.
The risky (‘risk’ being deﬁned as the variance of the outcome) choice
would lead to either the gain or the loss of £1, while the less risky option
would lead to either the gain or loss of 10 pence. There were two
contextual cues. One was associated with 80% chance of winning £1 (and a
corresponding 20% chance of losing £1) following the risky choice and with
80% chance of winning 10 pence (and a 20% chance of losing 10 pence)
following the less risky choice. For the other cue the contingencies were the
opposite, that is, the risky choice would lead to an 80% chance of losing £1,
while the less risky choice gave an 80% chance of losing 10 pence.
An unannounced contingency reversal occurred after each block of 60
trials (for a total of three reversals across the 240 trials). Reversal means
that the positive cue (for which the risky choice was optimal) became the
negative one and vice-versa. Therefore participants encountered the same
contingency set only twice during the experiment.
Two abstract cues randomly taken among 24 letters from the
Agathodaimon font were used. After ﬁxation delay and cue display, the
response interval was indicated on the computer screen by a question
mark. The interval was ﬁxed to 3 s and the response was taken at the end:
this response was categorized as ‘risky’or ‘less risky’ and was written on the
screen as soon as the delay had elapsed. Monetary outcome was then
displayed for 2 s. Participants were explicitly told that they would not
receive the virtual money earned during the task. Instead, they were paid a
ﬁx amount that compensated for their time and their expenses associated
with taking part in the study.
Before performing the task in the scanner, participants were familiarized
with the task structure and with the notion that cue-outcome relationships
were not necessarily constant. However, they were not warned that
contingencies could be reversed.
Model-free behavioral analysis
The overall percentage of risky response and button presses were
compared between sessions in order to assess drug effects on choice
and motor impulsivity, respectively. To assess drug effects on learning, the
percentage of optimal responses (risky choice for the positive cue, less
risky choice for the negative cue) were collapsed across the two cues and
averaged within six bins of 10 consecutive trials. These data were then
submitted to repeated-measure analysis of variance with three experi-
mental factors (bin*block*session) and subjects as random factor. Post-hoc
comparisons were performed to characterize the learning deﬁcit observed
under ketamine.
Model-based behavioral analysis
The whole model space consisted of 27 models (see SOM): three variants of
the reinforcement learning level without any conﬁdence monitoring plus 24
variants of the hierarchical model (three reinforcement learning models ×
two ways to compute conﬁdence× four ways to modulate low-level
parameters) (see Figure 3 for a more detailed description of model space).
All models were inverted using a variational Bayes approach under the
Laplace approximation,35–37 http://sites.google.com/site/jeandaunizeaus
website/). This algorithm not only inverts nonlinear models but also
estimates their evidence, which represents a trade-off between accuracy
(goodness of ﬁt) and complexity (degrees of freedom). The log-evidences
estimated for each participant and model were submitted to a group-level
random-effect analysis separately for placebo and ketamine sessions. To
complete model selection, we also performed family analyses.37
fMRI data analysis
fMRI data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using SPM5 toolbox
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) running on
Matlab (Mathworks). T1-weighted structural images were coregistered with
the mean functional image, segmented, and normalized to a standard T1
template and averaged across all subjects to allow group-level anatomical
localization. The ﬁrst ﬁve volumes of each session were discarded to allow
for T1 equilibration effects. Preprocessing consisted of spatial realignment,
normalization using the same transformation as structural images, and
spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a full-width at half-
maximum of 8mm.
We devised two general linear models (GLM) to account for individual
time series. The ﬁrst GLM included separate categorical regressors for cue
and outcome onsets, respectively, modulated by the computational
variables, βm and αm. As parametric modulators were applied to different
categorical regressors, they were not orthogonalized to each other. Note,
however, that their correlation was quite low (R2 = 0.1) In the second GLM,
outcome onsets were modulated by two computational variables,
outcome category (conﬁrmatory vs contradictory) and αm, that were
serially orthogonalized, following on SPM default procedure. This second
GLM was exclusively used for the region of interest (ROI) analysis. These
variables were computed using subject-speciﬁc free parameters of the best
ﬁtting computational model (see computational results) and were then z-
scored. All regressors of interest were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function. To correct for motion artifacts, subject-
speciﬁc realignment parameters were modeled as covariates of no interest.
Linear contrasts of regression coefﬁcients were computed at the subject
level and then taken to group-level random effect analyses.
Neural correlates of choice temperature and learning rate were
identiﬁed in placebo sessions using a whole-brain one-sample t-test
(cluster generating threshold Po0.001 uncorrected, cluster level threshold
Po0.05 family-wise error corrected). The impact of ketamine on these
networks was assessed using a paired t-test between ketamine and
placebo sessions (cluster generating threshold Po0.01 uncorrected,
cluster level threshold Po0.05 family-wise error corrected). In order to
maximize sensitivity and to ensure that drug effects were only assessed
within task-relevant networks, this analysis was masked by the parametric
modulations (by choice temperature or learning rate) obtained when
pooling placebo and ketamine sessions.
For ROI analyses, we extracted the regression estimates (betas) from
spheres of 8mm in diameter (corresponding to the full-width at half-
maximum of the Gaussian kernel used for spatial smoothing), centered on
group-level activation peaks. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
ROI, that was used to perform a comparison between placebo and
ketamine session, was deﬁned from the second-level analysis pooling both
placebo and ketamine sessions in order to avoid biasing this comparison in
favor of placebo sessions.
Additional GLMs were computed for illustrative purpose only. In these
GLMs, trials were sorted in six bins of conﬁdence (as deﬁned in the best
computational model) or trial number in a block (as in the model-free analysis:
the ﬁrst ten trials of each block, the following ten and so on). These GLMs
were used to plot the hemodynamic response at cue and outcome onsets.
RESULTS
Clinical assessments
The mean blood plasma concentration of ketamine during
infusion was 96.01 ± 19.11 ngml− 1. Paired t-tests indicated that
ketamine caused a signiﬁcant increase in positive psychotic
symptoms as measured by the Rating Scale for Psychotic
Symptoms (t(20) = 5.43, Po0.001) and the Brief Psychiatric Rating
Scale (t(20) = 2.8, P= 0.011), as well as in dissociative symptoms as
measured by the Clinician Administered Dissociative States Scale
(t(20) = 3.72, P= 0.0013).
Behavioral results
Choice and motor impulsivity did not differ between drug
conditions (risky choice: 48.2% vs 47.8%, t(20) = 0.29, P=0.8; button
press: 53.0% vs 51.7%, t(20) = 1.05, P=0.3). There was a main effect
of learning, with optimal choices increasing across bins (F
(5,100)= 66.77, Po0.001), a main effect of block (F(3,60) = 4.57,
Po0.01) with more optimal choices during the ﬁrst (pre-reversal)
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block (80%) compared with others (74%). There was no other main
effect and no interaction between factors (all P40.1). Post-hoc
analysis showed a signiﬁcant effect of drug status in the last trial
bin (see Figure 2a), with higher performance under placebo
(F(1,20) = 5.641, P=0.028) without main effect nor interaction with
block (both P40.1). Indeed, during ketamine infusion, participants
apportioned their responses in a way that matched or slightly
exceeded the 80% probability of positive reinforcement (81.1%, t
(20) = 0.37, P=0.7 in comparison with 80%). In contrast, they
optimized their behavior under placebo (87.2%, t(20) = 2.52, P=0.02
compared to 80%). In summary, this preliminary behavioral analysis
suggests that ketamine reduced the ability to go beyond
probability matching, that is, to stabilize behavior in the face of
probabilistic (misleading) unexpected outcomes. This hypothesis
was formally assessed by using computational modeling.
Computational modeling results
To explore a comprehensive set of possible strategies, we ﬁtted
qualitatively different models to the observed choices (see SOM
for details). All models estimate the trial-wise values attached to
the two cues, and use these values to predict choices, through a
softmax function.
A ﬁrst series of models were designed to account for low-level
reinforcement learning. Following a standard ‘delta’ rule,38 these
models update after each trial the current cue value in proportion
to prediction error, deﬁned as the outcome value minus the
expected value.
In a basic version, the outcome was simply the monetary
amount (+£1, +0.1£, − 0.1£ or -1£). In a second version, we
integrated some understanding of the task structure by including
the possibility that cue values were coded at a more abstract level,
as if subjects ﬁgured out that all the information needed was the
outcome valence (+ or − ). In a third version the two cue values
were updated after every outcome, to model the possibility that
subjects realized that they always had an opposite valence, that is,
information about the status of one cue also gave information
about the status of the other.
Reinforcement learning models have constant parameters
(learning rate α and choice stochasticity β). This limits the capacity
to optimize the behavioral policy around the end of learning
blocks, once subjects believe themselves to have a reasonably
good estimation of contingencies. At this point, prediction errors
should be tempered, and choices tuned to a more deterministic
exploitation of learned contingencies.29,39,40 Conversely, when
contingencies suddenly change after reversals, prediction errors
should be given more weight, and choices should be more
exploratory. This can be implemented in an optimal way using a
hierarchical Bayesian architecture.29,40 Some evidence has been
found that human behavior can be accounted for by hierarchical
Bayesian models.41,42 However, Bayesian updates of probability
distributions may become computationally cumbersome, and
human subjects sometimes follow simpler heuristics, particularly
when they are uncertain about the task structure.43,44 Another
way to optimize behavior is to subordinate the reinforcement
learning parameters to a higher level of control that monitors
performance. This idea has been proposed and formalized in the
so-called meta-learning theoretical framework,45 which addresses
the question of how machines can learn how to learn. This
principle has been implemented for instance to adjust the
exploration rate during the course of learning, and provides a
good ﬁt of nearly optimal primate behavior.46,47
A second series of models followed this latter principle: they
included a meta-cognitive level consisting in updating conﬁdence
(the belief that current representations are correct) so as to
downregulate contingency learning and choice stochasticity.
These hierarchical models allowed us to determine more precisely
which level of learning was altered by ketamine infusion.
Conﬁdence was monitored using a delta rule in all the following
models, which differed in the way outcomes were used to assess
performance. A ﬁrst variant used the absolute value of the
prediction error generated in the lower reinforcement learning
level, implementing the intuition that subjects should be more
conﬁdent when prediction errors are reduced.48,49 A second
variant (following Khamassi et al.47) coded the outcome in terms
of optimality: 0 for non-optimal outcomes (losing £1 or winning
only 10p) and 1 for optimal outcomes (winning £1 or losing only
10p). In both variants, conﬁdence could be used to modulate
learning rate (αm), choice temperature (βm) or both, with different
or identical weight. Optimizing choice temperature means
favoring exploitation when conﬁdence increases. Optimizing
learning rate means increasing sensitivity to conﬁrmatory out-
comes and decreasing sensitivity to contradictory outcomes when
conﬁdence increases. Conﬁrmatory means that the valence of the
outcome is the same as the valence estimated by the model. Thus,
when conﬁdence was close to 0, the learning rate was similar for
conﬁrmatory and contradictory outcomes, but as conﬁdence
increased, it got closer to 1 for conﬁrmatory outcomes and to 0 for
contradictory outcomes.
Bayesian model selection was performed separately for placebo
and ketamine sessions (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). The best model
Figure 2. Characterization of the behavioral deﬁcit induced by
ketamine (a) Learning curves. Curves show percentage of correct
response average across blocks, cues and bins of 10 consecutive
trials, for the placebo (blue) and ketamine (red) sessions, separately.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of drug status in the last trial bin,
with higher performance with placebo. Bold lines represent means;
color-delimited areas represent inter-subject s.e.m (corrected for
the variance across subject: the grand mean of each subject was
removed from its data before computing s.e.m.). (b) Parameter
estimates for the best computational model. The only parameter
that signiﬁcantly differed between sessions (placebo in blue versus
ketamine in red) was κ, the weight that conﬁdence had on learning
rate and choice temperature. α0: learning rate value when
conﬁdence= 0; β0: choice temperature value when conﬁdence= 0;
C0: initial conﬁdence value; γ: conﬁdence learning rate. Bars
represent means; error bars represent inter-subject s.e.m (corrected
for the variance across subject: the grand mean of each subject was
removed from its data before computing s.e.m.); *Po0.05, two-
tailed paired t-test.
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was the same in both sessions but the evidence was higher for
placebo (xp= 0.96; Supplementary Table S1) than for ketamine
(xp= 0.45; Supplementary Table S2). At the low level, this best
model implemented an informed reinforcement learning rule,
using the outcome valence (+ or − ) to update the two cue values.
At the high level, conﬁdence was updated using the outcome
optimality, and impacted both learning rate and choice tempera-
ture, with identical weights. Family model comparison37 conﬁrmed
that the best model was the same in both sessions though in
ketamine sessions there was less clear evidence for the necessity of
a meta-cognitive level that monitors conﬁdence and allows
conﬁdence to modulate low-level parameters (see SOM for details).
We next compared the free parameters of this best model
between placebo and ketamine sessions, with paired-tests
(Figure 2b, Supplementary Table S3). The parameter that signiﬁ-
cantly differed between sessions was the weight that conﬁdence
had on learning rate and choice temperature (t(20) = 2.3, P=0.027).
Thus, ketamine reduced the impact of conﬁdence on low-level
parameters. This attenuation could therefore explain the deleterious
effect of the drug on ability to optimize behavior when conﬁdence
increases, towards the end of learning blocks.
Neuroimaging results
The computational analysis demonstrated that the behavioral
effects of ketamine were underpinned by a shift in the dynamics
of choice temperature and learning rate (βm and αm), which were
insufﬁciently tuned by the conﬁdence increases within learning
blocks. To identify the underlying neural effects, we therefore
focused on the neural representation of βm and αm, which, in
principle, should be used to make choices at cue onsets and to
update values at outcome onsets respectively. For each time point
(cue and outcome onsets), we ﬁrst analyzed the placebo session
to identify the neural representation of βm or αm in the normal
brain. We then directly compared placebo and ketamine sessions.
At choice onset. Under placebo, βm was correlated with activity
in a large fronto-parietal network, including dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (dmPFC), frontopolar cortex and bilateral lateral
Figure 3. Model evidence (variational Bayesian approximation to marginal likelihood). The structure of the model space can be divided as
follows. (i) Which RL variant? In variant 1, the reinforcer was the monetary amount; in variant 2, the reinforcer was the sign of the outcome; in
variant 3, the reinforcer was the sign of the outcome and the two cue values were updated after every outcome. (ii) How to compute
conﬁdence? In a ﬁrst variant, it was based on the absolute value of the prediction error. In a second variant, it was based on the optimality of
the outcome, that is, 0 for non-optimal outcomes (losing £1 or winning only 10p) or 1 for optimal outcomes (winning £1 or losing only 10p).
(iii) How to use conﬁdence? Conﬁdence was used to modulate the learning, choice temperature or both (with same or different weight). The
arrow indicates the best model. Note that even the difference between the two rightmost bars is410, which is considered to be a very strong
difference in model evidence.
Figure 4. Description of the best model. The best model was
selected using a group-level random-effect analysis. It included
the third variant of RL (as if subjects ﬁgured out that only the
outcome valence, and not the monetary amount, was informative
about cue value, and that the two cues always had opposite valence
such that they could both be updated after every outcome).
Conﬁdence was based on outcome optimality and used to modulate
both the learning rate and choice temperature, with a same
weight. Q is cue value; C is conﬁdence; Op is outcome optimality
(1 for winning £1 or losing 10p, -1 otherwise); Val is outcome valence
(1 if positive, − 1 otherwise); P risky/A is the probability of choosing
the risky option when cue A is on screen. γ is conﬁdence learning
rate; α0 is learning rate value when conﬁdence= 0; β0 is choice
temperature value when conﬁdence= 0; κ is the weight of
conﬁdence on learning rate and choice temperature.
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Figure 5. Model-based analysis of ketamine-induced changes in brain activity (a) Brain regions reﬂecting conﬁdence-modulated choice
temperature (βm). (b) Brain regions reﬂecting conﬁdence-modulated learning rate (αm). Colored clusters show signiﬁcant correlation in the
placebo session (positive in dark blue, negative in light blue) and signiﬁcant difference between placebo and ketamine sessions (in orange).
All clusters survived a statistical threshold of Po0.05 after family wise error correction for multiple comparisons. Coordinates of anatomical
slices are given in Montreal Neurological Institute space. (c) Hemodynamic response to cue onset in the dmPFC as a function of conﬁdence
bins or as a function of time (trial number, pooled across blocks) (for illustrative purpose). (d) Hemodynamic response to outcome onset in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as a function of conﬁdence bins or as a function of time (trial number, pooled across blocks) (for illustrative
purpose), shown separately for conﬁrmatory and contradictory outcomes. Placebo data are in blue, ketamine data are in red, pooled data are
in violet. Bold lines represent means; color-delimited areas represent inter-subject s.e.m (corrected for the variance across subject: the grand
mean of each subject was removed from its data before computing s.e.m.).
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prefrontal cortex. Other correlations were observed in the anterior
insula, in addition to subcortical regions encompassing bilateral
caudate nucleus, thalamus and cerebellum (Figure 5, Table 1). Put
simply, elevated temperature was associated with enhanced
activity in these regions. Conversely, βm was negatively correlated
with activity in a bilateral network including cuneus, precuneus,
posterior cingulate and medial temporal lobe.
In the ketamine session, the positive correlation with βm was
signiﬁcantly reduced compared to placebo in a bilateral fronto-
parietal network, including the dmPFC, bilateral frontopolar
cortex, bilateral lateral prefrontal cortex and left parietal cortex,
as well as the anterior insula (Figure 5, Table 1). Thus, trial-to-trial
variations in temperature expressed in the fronto-parietal network
were diminished under ketamine. There was no signiﬁcant
difference between sessions for the negative correlation with βm.
At outcome onset. Under placebo, we observed a positive
correlation with αm in the vmPFC and bilateral posterior insula
extending to the superior temporal cortex (Figure 5, Table 2). These
regions therefore increased their responses to conﬁrmatory out-
comes, and decreased their responses to contradictory outcomes,
as conﬁdence accumulated within learning blocks. Conversely,
there was a negative correlation in the right anterior insula.
There was no signiﬁcant difference in the correlation with αm
between placebo and ketamine sessions at the whole-brain level,
nor in a ROI analysis focusing on the vmPFC (P40.1). Correlation
with αm corresponds to an interaction between conﬁdence and
outcome category (conﬁrmatory or contradictory). We veriﬁed
that the correlation was not reducible to the main effect of
outcome category: when this was regressed out, the correlation
with αm was still signiﬁcant in our vmPFC ROI under placebo (t
(20) = 2.79; P= 0.01) but not under ketamine (t(20) = 1.41; P= 0.18),
though the direct comparison was not signiﬁcant (P40.1). In
short, under placebo but not ketamine, the difference between
conﬁrmatory and contradictory outcomes was ampliﬁed following
the trial-wise increase in conﬁdence within learning blocks.
DISCUSSION
Our working hypothesis was that early psychosis is characterized
by a state in which the ability to acquire a robust and conﬁdent
model of the world is lost. We tested this hypothesis at both the
computational and neural levels, by combining a pharmacological
model of early psychosis through NMDA blockade with model-
based analysis of behavioral choices and fMRI data. The effects of
NMDA blockade manifested in two ways:1 a decreased ability to
optimize contingency learning in conditions of high conﬁdence,2 a
concurrent alteration in the regulation of brain systems reﬂecting
choice stochasticity, notably in a bilateral fronto-parietal network
including the dmPFC. Through use of a low dose of ketamine
(rather than a higher one which would cause global cognitive
difﬁculties), we have been able to identify a subtle and
interpretable effect. Our ﬁndings have implications both for our
understanding of contingency learning mechanisms and for
theoretical perspectives on the emergence of psychosis. Because
our experiment was carried out in a limited number of
participants, as is common to pharmaco-MRI studies for obvious
ethical reasons, we consider the implications below as primarily
theoretical suggestions that will guide further investigations.
Contingency learning mechanisms in an unstable environment
Our benchmark computational model was a standard Q-learning
algorithm, which has been shown to provide a good account of
instrumental learning in a variety of situations.50 However, the task
was expressly designed such that Q-learning would not be
optimal. This is because Q-learning gives a constant weight to
Table 1. Brain regions reﬂecting conﬁdence-modulated choice
temperature (βm)
Structure MNI coordinates (x, y, z) Z-score
Positive Dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex
− 4, 24, 48 4.83
48, 20, 52 4.78
Dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex
48, 28, 42 5
36, 52, 24 4.31
− 28, 56, 26 4.18
− 46, 14, 44 4.26
− 38, 30, 42 4.24
36, 54, − 4 3.91
Frontopolar cortex 14, 60, − 10 4.66
− 42, 48, − 4 4.05
− 22, 58, − 6 4.49
50, − 52, 46 4.01
(Inferior) parietal
cortex
− 42, − 52, 42 4.73
34, 22, − 12 4.09
Anterior insula 38, 22, 6 3.99
− 36, 18, − 6 3.96
40, − 66, − 50 3.74
Cerebellum − 28, − 74, − 36 4.72
16, 2, 14 4.6
Caudate nucleus 10, − 12, 0 4.17
Thalamus − 8, − 14, 0 4.35
Negative Precuneus − 12, − 48, 12 4.31
Posterior cingulate 22, − 52, 20 4.25
− 12, − 58, 22 3.93
Cuneus 22, − 88, 26 3.41
Medial temporal
lobe
36, − 38, − 2 4.55
− 40, − 36, − 6 3.53
Post-central gyrus 24, − 48, 66 3.49
Placebo vs
ketamine
Insula 48, 12, 8 3.77
36, 20, 8 2.82
Cerebellum 38, − 66, − 46 3.87
− 10, − 82, − 24 3.15
Middle frontal gyrus 30, 18, 38 3.6
− 42, 16, 42 3.27
Dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex
6, 26, 60 3.07
12, 26, 52 3.03
− 4, 26, 58 2.96
Dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex
40, 56, 20 2.81
46, 30, 38 2.62
− 42, 16, 42 3.27
− 36, 12, 52 2.79
(Inferior) parietal
cortex
− 54, − 44, 42 3.26
frontopolar cortex − 36, 54, 12 3.1
42, 58, − 4 2.67
Table 2. Brain regions reﬂecting conﬁdence-modulated learning rate
(αm)
Structure MNI coordinates
(x, y, z)
Z-score
Positive Posterior insula 58, − 8, − 2 4.52
40, − 18, − 2 3.69
− 36, − 18, − 2 3.68
Ventromedial prefrontal
cortex
6, 36, − 10 4.09
Negative Anterior insula 38, 26, − 6 3.7
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outcomes in value updating, and a constant weight to value
estimates in decision making. Yet it is adaptive to adjust these
weights in unstable environments, where contingencies are
stochastic and susceptible to sudden reversals, depending on
the conﬁdence in value estimates. Behavioral data suggested that
participants did modulate choice and learning parameters as a
function of conﬁdence. To analyze this we developed a
hierarchical model with a meta-cognitive level that monitors
conﬁdence and modulates ﬁrst-level Q-learning parameters, an
approach that has been formalized in the meta-learning
framework.45,46,51 At the meta-cognitive level, Bayesian model
selection indicated that an independent delta rule on outcome
optimality (similar to that used in Khamassi et al.47) provided a
better ﬁt than a direct accumulation of unsigned prediction errors
(as implemented in 48). Our construct of conﬁdence can therefore
be considered as surface monitoring, since it remains blind to
the computations driving choices. In the model that best captured
the behavioral data, both choice temperature and learning rate
were dynamically adjusted as a function of conﬁdence. Moreover,
conﬁdence had a differential impact on conﬁrmatory outcomes
(whose weight was ampliﬁed) and contradictory outcomes (whose
weight was reduced). Together, these conﬁdence-based adjust-
ments enabled stabilizing internal representations of environ-
mental contingencies (cue value estimates) and optimizing
behavioral policy (exploitation of cue values).
Our concept of conﬁdence can be linked to several recent
theoretical propositions, in which higher level representations
control lower-level processes. For example, it has been suggested
that uncertainty, which quantiﬁes ignorance about true values,
drives the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.52 In the
predictive coding framework, the precision of (or conﬁdence in)
beliefs determines the weight that prediction errors have in belief
updating. Indeed, aberrant encoding of precision has been recently
proposed to account for various aspects of psychosis.10 Some
implementations of hierarchical Bayesian modeling can also be
seen as very close to our approach, particularly when both the
learning and decision rules are modulated by precision estimates.42
Note however that a new and important feature of our model is the
differential impact of conﬁdence on learning depending on the
nature of the outcome (conﬁrmatory or not), which allows neglect
of contradictory information. We acknowledge that the concept of
conﬁdence is used for convenience, and corresponds in fact to a
running estimate of performance. Whether this measure matches
what participants would report as a feeling of conﬁdence remains
to be demonstrated.
Neuroimaging data provided additional support for our
hierarchical model. At the time of cues, trial-wise variation in
choice temperature was reﬂected in activation of a fronto-parietal
network that has been previously implicated in cognitive
control.53–57 This does not imply that all these regions have the
function of representing choice temperature. Their activity might
represent an indirect correlate of variations in this computational
variable. In particular, regions such as the dmPFC has been
involved in monitoring errors,58,59 detecting conﬂicts60,61 and
making decisions under uncertainty.59,62,63 This region might
signal the necessity of additional control, or even implement this
necessary control, in periods of doubt regarding which choice is
the best.64,65 At the time of outcomes, trial-wise variation in
learning rate was positively reﬂected in regions such as the
vmPFC, which has been implicated in encoding the subjective
value of stimuli.66,67 Here, this region increased its response to
conﬁrmatory outcomes, and decreased its response to contra-
dictory outcomes, from the beginning to the end of learning
blocks. This ﬁnding extends a previous report that the vmPFC
integrates option value and choice conﬁdence68 by showing that
this integration also applies to outcomes. Interestingly, the reverse
pattern of activity was observed in the anterior insula, a region
involved in signaling aversive values.69,70 Thus, these two regions
appeared to mediate the inﬂuence of meta-cognitive control on
proximal reactions to gains and losses, such that they align to the
distal goal of optimizing performance.
Emergence of psychosis through NMDA blockade
Model-based analysis of the behavior suggested that NMDA
blockade was associated with a reduced capacity to stabilize an
internal model in order to capitalize on environmental regularities.
This was evidenced by a reduced weight of conﬁdence on choice
temperature and learning rate. The performance deﬁcit induced
by ketamine infusion was therefore observed at the end of
learning blocks, when conﬁdence should be high enough to
stabilize cue value estimation and exploitation policy. Our ﬁndings
thus show that ketamine was associated with diminished ability to
stabilize cue value estimates in the presence of probabilistic errors,
as if a persistent doubt undermined optimization of behavior and
made them more vulnerable to the effects of ‘noise’ trials.
In a very simple environment as in our task (two cues with
opposite values), such an impairment has limited impact and
could hardly induce strange beliefs. In a more complex environ-
ment, where multiple internal explanatory models can be held at
the same time, we would expect this impairment to forge strange
beliefs, by combination of existing models or through the
emergence of unexpected explanations. Our results therefore
extend previous accounts of early psychosis, in which altered
prediction errors lead to a sense of strangeness and to
abnormalities in belief updating.9,15,26 Our ﬁndings suggest that
it is important to take into account not just how prediction errors
are used in low-level associative learning, but in how outcome
optimality is integrated to modulate low-level parameters, via
conﬁdence monitoring.
We note that changes in key behavioral parameters did not
correlate with the subtle psychopathology induced by this low dose
of ketamine. This is perhaps unsurprising given the lack of statistical
power—our experiment was devised with a view to identifying
differences between ketamine and placebo rather than across-
subject correlations. We see two other reasons that could account
for this limitation. First, the neuro-cognitive perturbations that we
demonstrated here might have different kinetics from those of
psychotic symptoms (the former preceding the latter). Therefore,
these two dimensions might remain uncorrelated at a given time.
Second, if we assume that psychotic-like symptoms yield from more
elementary cognitive dysfunctions, this link could be modulated
(and hence blurred) by several factors, such as the existence of
baseline (pre-ketamine) bizarre ideas, or the ability to introspect and
conscious access to these dysfunctions and therefore to report
psychotic-like symptoms.
In line with the behavioral analysis, the fMRI data showed that
the conﬁdence-based modulation of Q-learning parameters was
signiﬁcantly altered during ketamine infusion. Speciﬁcally, brain
activity reﬂecting choice temperature was signiﬁcantly less
modulated by conﬁdence under ketamine than placebo. This
difference was observed in a bilateral fronto-parietal network,
including the dmPFC. A detrimental effect of ketamine on dmPFC
activation is in line with repeated observations of dorsal cingulate
cortex impairment in patients with schizophrenia.71 Critically, here
we offer a computational account of this effect, suggesting that
that dmPFC impairment might play a key role in early symptoms
of psychosis by compromising belief updating and policy
adjustment in unstable environments. This dmPFC dysfunction
could either alter conﬁdence level or perturb the impact of
conﬁdence on behavioral policy.
The effect of ketamine on fronto-parietal regions might also relate
to the well-established changes in consciousness produced by
higher doses of ketamine,72 since the global workspace theory.73,74
implicates these regions in conscious access by Interestingly,
modulation of choice temperature by conﬁdence was initially
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proposed to regulate the activity of workspace neurons whose role is
to determine the degree of effort invested in decision making46,47 in
keeping with the concept of vigilance.73 One may speculate that the
meta-cognitive component of our model, notably conﬁdence
monitoring and down-regulation of choice temperature, requires
conscious processing. Thus, dysfunction of this part could be linked
to both alteration of consciousness with higher doses of ketamine
and to dysfunction of conscious processing in schizophrenic
patients,75,76 who would perform contingency learning in a more
implicit way. Evidence for such a speculation would require further
experiments manipulating consciousness levels.
The earliest stages of psychotic illness present an intriguing and
puzzling set of cognitive changes. Computational psychiatry1,3
offers new and rich frameworks for considering these changes and
linking them to underlying neural alterations. Here we have
shown that pharmacological fMRI, employing a well-established
drug model of psychosis, presents a powerful tool in developing
such frameworks, offering an opportunity to determine how
controlled perturbations in glutamate function relate to altered
balance in the dynamic control of optimal learning and behavior.
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Description of model space 
-­‐	  Reinforcement	  learning	  level We	  started	  with	  a	  basic,	  model-­‐free	  reinforcement	   learning	  algorithm.(1)	  For	  each	  cue	  (say	  A	  or	  B),	  the	  model	  estimated	  the	  expected	  value,	  based	  on	  the	  individual	  outcome	  history,	   and	  made	  a	   choice	  between	   risky	   and	   less	   risky	  options.	  The	   expected	  values	  were	  set	  at	  zero	  before	  learning,	  and	  after	  each	  trial	  t	  the	  value	  of	  the	  ongoing	  cue	  (say	  A)	  was	  updated	  in	  proportion	  to	  prediction	  error,	  according	  to	  the	  'delta'	  rule	  (2,	  3):	   
QA (t+1) = QA (t) + 𝛼	  × 𝛿 (t) where	  δ(t)	  is	  the	  prediction	  error,	  defined	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  actual	  and	  expected	  outcome:	  𝛿(𝑡)=𝑅Q(𝑡)− QA(𝑡).	   Then	  the	  probability,	  or	  likelihood,	  of	  a	  “Risky”	  choice	  was	  estimated	  from	  the	  expected	  value	  according	  to	  the	  softmax	  rule: 
PA Risky (t) = 1/ (1 + exp
(-Q
A
(t)/β))  The	   learning	   rate	   α	   and	   the	   choice	   temperature	   β	   are	   free	   parameters,	   with	   the	  constraints	  0≤α≤1	  and	  β>0.	  	  The	  learning	  rate	  adjusts	  the	  weight	  assigned	  to	  prediction	  error	   in	   value	   updating,	   and	   the	   choice	   temperature	   the	   degree	   of	   exploration	   (as	  opposed	  to	  exploitation	  of	  the	  learned	  value).	   We	  devised	   three	   variants	   of	   this	   reinforcement	   learning	   level,	   following	   step-­‐by-­‐step	  increments	   from	  model-­‐free	   to	  model-­‐based	  strategy,	   i.e.	   adding	  pieces	  of	   information	  about	  task	  structure. In	  a	  first	  variant,	  the	  reinforcer	  RQ	  was	  the	  monetary	  value	  of	  the	  outcome	  (1,	  0.1,	  -­‐0.1	  or	  -­‐1).	  This	  variant	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  model-­‐free	  strategy,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  law	  of	  effect,	  meaning	   that	   outcomes	   increased	   the	   probability	   of	   repeating	   the	   same	   choice,	  depending	  on	  their	  sign	  and	  magnitude. In	  a	   second	  variant,	   the	  reinforcer	  RQ	  was	  defined	  according	   to	  outcome	  valence	   (Val)	  and	  not	  its	  magnitude	  (i.e.	  1	  when	  winning	  £1	  or	  10p;	  -­‐1	  when	  loosing	  £1	  or	  10p).	  This	  variant	   implies	   that	   subjects	   understood	   that	   cues	   determined	   the	   outcome	   valence	  (positive	  or	  negative)	  and	  not	  its	  magnitude,	  which	  depended	  on	  the	  choice.	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In	  a	  third	  variant,	  the	  reinforcer	  RQ	  was	  defined	  according	  to	  outcome	  valence	  (Val)	  and	  the	  update	  of	  the	  current	  cue	  (say	  cue	  A)	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  alternative	  cue	  (cue	  B). QB	  (t+1)	  =	  -­‐QA	  (t+1)	   This	   variant	   implies	   that	   subjects	   understood	   that	   there	   were	   only	   two	   cues,	   with	  opposite	  valence.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  two	  cue	  values	  summed	  up	  to	  zero.	  	   
- Meta-learning level Reinforcement	   learning	   models	   have	   constant	   parameters	   (learning	   rate	   and	   choice	  stochasticity).	  This	  limits	  the	  capacity	  to	  optimize	  the	  behavioral	  policy	  around	  the	  end	  of	   learning	   blocks,	   once	   subjects	   believe	   themselves	   to	   have	   a	   reasonably	   good	  estimation	   of	   contingencies.	   At	   this	   point,	   prediction	   errors	   should	   be	   tempered,	   and	  choices	   tuned	   to	   a	   more	   deterministic	   exploitation	   of	   learned	   contingencies.(4-­‐6)	  Conversely,	   when	   contingencies	   suddenly	   change	   after	   reversals,	   prediction	   errors	  should	   be	   given	   more	   weight,	   and	   choices	   should	   be	   more	   exploratory.	   One	   way	   to	  optimize	   the	   behavior	   is	   to	   subordinate	   the	   reinforcement	   learning	   parameters	   to	   a	  higher	  level	  of	  control	  that	  monitors	  performance.	  A	  second	  series	  of	  models	  therefore	  included	  a	  meta-­‐cognitive	  level	  consisting	  in	  updating	  confidence	  so	  as	  to	  down-­‐regulate	  contingency	   learning	   and	   choice	   stochasticity.	   We	   compared	   two	   ways	   to	   monitor	  confidence	  and	  four	  ways	  to	  use	  it.	  
-­‐	  Confidence	  monitoring	  level In	  both	  variants,	  confidence	  was	  monitored	  using	  a	  delta	  rule.	  The	  confidence	  learning	  rate	  γ was	  a	   free	  parameter,	  with	  0≤γ≤1.	  The	   initial	  value	  of	  confidence,	  C(0)	  was	  also	  fitted	  as	  a	  free	  parameter,	  with	  0≤C(0)≤1. In	   a	   first	   variant,	  we	  used	   the	   absolute	   value	   of	   the	   prediction	   error	   computed	   at	   the	  reinforcement	  learning	  level	  to	  update	  confidence	  (7): 	   C(t+1)	  =	  C(t)	  +	  γ × ((2-|δ(t)|)/2	  -­‐	  C(t)) In	  a	  second	  variant,	  we	  used	  outcome	  optimality	   (Op)	   to	  update	  confidence	   	   (i.e.	  1	   for	  winning	  £1	  or	  losing	  10p,	  -­‐1	  otherwise):	  
 	   C(t+1)=	  C(t)	  +	  γ × (Op(t) – C(t)) 
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-­‐	  Modulation	  of	  low-­‐level	  free	  parameters Confidence	   was	   used	   to	   modulate	   the	   free	   parameters	   in	   the	   reinforcement	   learning	  models.	   This	   was	   done	   after	   each	   outcome,	   which	   brought	   information	   about	   how	  accurate	   the	   reinforcement	   learning	   model	   was,	   in	   terms	   of	   value	   estimates	   or	  behavioral	   policy.	   We	   considered	   four	   possibilities:	   modulation	   of	   learning	   rate	   or	  choice	  temperature,	  or	  both	  with	  the	  same	  weight,	  or	  both	  with	  a	  different	  weight.	   The	   learning	   rate	   was	   modulated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   not	   only	   confidence	   but	   also	   the	  outcome	  category.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  to	  stabilize	  a	  representation	  of	  learned	  contingencies,	  subjects	  should	  increase	  their	  sensitivity	  to	  confirmation	  and	  decrease	  their	  sensitivity	  to	  contradiction.	  The	  impact	  of	  confidence	  on	  the	  learning	  rate	  𝛼 therefore	  depended	  on	  whether	   the	   outcome	  was	   confirmatory	   (outcome	   and	   cue	   value	   have	   the	   same	   sign;	  Val(t)	  =	  sign(Q(t)))	  or	  not.	  
 For	  confirmatory	  outcomes,	  𝛼	  was	  modulated	  as	  follows:	   𝛼m(t)	  =	  (𝛼0	  +	  k𝛼*C(t))/(1+k𝛼*C(t))	  where	  𝛼0  and	  k𝛼	  are	  free	  parameter And	  for	  contradictory	  outcomes: 𝛼m(t)	  =	  𝛼0/(1+	  k	  𝛼*C(t))	  	  Therefore,	  when	  confidence	  increased	  the	  modified	  learning	  rate	  𝛼m	  got	  closer	  to	  1	  for	  confirmatory	  outcomes	  and	  closer	  to	  zero	  for	  contradictory	  outcomes. 
 The	   choice	   temperature	   β	   was	   modulated	   such	   that	   exploration	   was	   reduced	   when	  confidence	  increased:	   βm(t)	  =	  β0/(1+kß*C(t))	  where	  β0  and	  kß	  are	  free	  parameter This	  modulation	  enables	  increasing	  exploitation	  above	  matching	  behavior,	  i.e.	  choosing	  the	  risky	  option	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  the	  time	  following	  a	  cue	  that	  associated	  to	  a	  reward	  80%	  of	  the	  time.	   To	  test	  whether	  these	  modulations	  improved	  the	  fit	  of	  observed	  choices,	  we	  compared	  between	  models	  that	  included	  or	  not	  the	  free	  parameters	  (k𝛼	  and	  kß),	  which	  could	  have	  or	  not	  identical	  values.	  	  
Other hierarchical models 
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Other	   hierarchical	   models	   have	   been	   developed	   to	   implement	   a	   form	   of	   second-­‐level	  confidence	  that	  modulates	  first-­‐level	  estimates.	  For	  instance,	  one	  hierarchical	  Bayesian	  architecture	  models	  the	  behavior	  in	  a	  probabilistic	  reversal	  learning	  task,	  with	  a	  second-­‐level	   inference	   that	   tracks	   the	   occurrence	   of	   contingency	   reversals.(8)	   However,	  reversals	  were	  numerous	  in	  this	  task	  and	  participants	  were	  extensively	  trained,	  so	  they	  had	  built	   an	   internal	  model	   of	   the	   task	   (including	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   reversal)	   before	  entering	   the	   scanner.	   In	   our	   paradigm,	   participants	   were	   not	   informed	   about	   the	  presence	  of	  reversals	  and	  they	  encountered	  only	  three	  of	  them,	  which	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  build	   and	   integrate	   an	   explicit	   notion	   of	   reversal	   at	   the	   meta-­‐cognitive	   level.	  Unsurprisingly,	  we	   found	  no	  evidence	   that	   the	  behavior	  was	  more	  easily	   reversed	   the	  last	  time	  compared	  to	  the	  first	  one:	  if	  anything,	  performance	  in	  the	  last	  block	  was	  worst.	  For	   similar	   reasons,	   we	   did	   not	   include	   the	   possibility	   of	   re-­‐using	   contingencies	   that	  were	  learned	  in	  previous	  blocks,	  as	  was	  done	  in	  another	  hierarchical	  model	  with	  task-­‐set	  monitoring	  on	  top	  of	  Q-­‐learning.(9)	   Indeed,	   there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	   the	  second	  and	   third	   reversals,	   after	  which	   subjects	   could	  have	   returned	   to	  previous	   contingency	  sets,	   were	   learned	   faster	   than	   the	   first	   one.	   In	   addition,	   none	   of	   the	   existing	   models	  implemented	   the	   differential	   impact	   of	   the	   meta-­‐cognitive	   level	   on	   the	   first-­‐level	  learning	  rule,	  which	  enables	  participants	   to	  specifically	   ignore	  contradictory	  outcomes	  (probabilistic	  errors),	  a	  key	  way	  to	  stabilize	  behavior	  at	  the	  end	  of	  blocks.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	  our	  paradigm	  was	  not	  designed	   to	   investigate	  reversal	  processes	  per	  se,	  but	  to	  examine	  how	  behavior	  is	  optimized	  between	  reversals.	  	  
 
 
 
Supplemental data 
Family analyses Family	  model	  comparison	  (10)	  was	  used	  to	  test	  whether	  each	  level	  of	  complexity	  added	  to	  the	  basic	  reinforcement	  learning	  model	  was	  necessary	  for	  explaining	  choice	  data.	  In a 
first comparison, the model space was divided into three families, depending on RL-variant 
(i.e. whether the monetary value or the outcome valence was integrated in the delta-rule and 
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whether the two cues or only the current cue was updated). Results	   confirmed	   that	  participants	  integrated	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  task	  structure	  (xp	  =0.97	  and	  0.93	  for	  placebo	  and	   ketamine	   sessions,	   respectively):	   first	   that	   only	   the	   outcome	   valence,	   and	   not	  monetary	   amount,	   was	   informative	   about	   cue	   value,	   and	   second	   that	   the	   two	   cues	  always	  had	  opposite	  valence	  such	  that	  they	  could	  both	  be	  updated	  after	  every	  outcome.	  
In a second comparison, we divided the model space into three families, according to the way 
confidence was updated (see Fig 3: no confidence monitoring (and therefore no modulation), 
prediction error-based and optimality-based confidence updating. 	  Evidence	  was	  higher	  for	  optimality-­‐based	   confidence	   updating	   (xp=1	   and	   0.74	   for	   placebo	   and	   ketamine	  sessions,	  respectively).	  In a third comparison, we divided the model space into five families, 
according to the way confidence was used (see Fig 3): no modulation (and therefore no 
confidence monitoring), modulation of learning rate, choice temperature, both with the same 
weight, or both with different weights. Results	   indicated	   that	   confidence	   was	   used	   to	  modulate	  both	   learning	  rate	  and	  choice	   temperature,	  with	   the	  same	  weight	   (xp=1	  and	  0.76	  for	  placebo	  and	  ketamine	  sessions,	  respectively).	  	  Correlation	  with	  psychotic-­‐like	  symptoms	  As	  our	  ultimate	  goal	  is	  to	  model	  delusion	  formation,	  we	  looked	  for	  correlations	  between	  psychotic-­‐like	   symptoms	   induced	   by	   ketamine	   and	   our	   behavioural	   and	   imaging	  findings.	   For	   each	  of	   the	  3	   scales	   (RSPS,	  CADS,	  BPRS),	   the	  difference	  between	  placebo	  and	  ketamine	  sessions	  was	  computed	  for	  each	  subject	  and	  correlated	  to	  our	  behavioural	  markers	  of	  ketamine	  effect	  (decreased	  performance	  in	  the	  last	  bin	  and	  decreased	  weight	  of	  confidence	  on	   learning	  rate	  and	  choice	  temperature).	  No	  significant	  correlation	  was	  found.	   As	   far	   as	   imaging	   results	   are	   concerned,	   we	   also	   searched	   to	   correlate	   the	  increase	  of	  psychological	  symptoms	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  positive	  correlation	  with	  βm	  induced	   by	   ketamine.	   Scores	   were	   entered	   as	   a	   covariant	   in	   second-­‐level	   GLM.	   No	  significant	  cluster	  was	  found.	  Supplementary	  tables	  Table	  S1	  Exceedance	  probabilities	  table	  for	  Placebo	  sessions.	  	  Table	  S2	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Exceedance	  probabilities	  table	  for	  Ketamine	  sessions.	  	  Table	  S3	  Parameter	  estimates	  for	  the	  best	  computational	  model	  	  Table	  S1 
 
Placebo 
  RL - Variant 
Confidence – 
Monitoring 
Variant 
Modulation 
of free 
parameters - 
Variant 
1 2 3 
0 0 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1 1 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1 2 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1 3 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00	  
1 4 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
2 1 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
2 2 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
2 3 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
2 4 0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.96 
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Table S3 
 
 𝛼0 β0 C0 γ κ 
Placebo 0.34 (0.12) 0.89 (0.74) 0.51 (0.04) 0.45 (0.15) 0.95 (0.39) 
Ketamine 0.29 (0.16) 0.97 (1.17) 0.50 (0.04) 0.50 (0.16) 0.62 (0.53) 
	  
 
Ketamine 
  RL - Variant 
Confidence – 
Monitoring 
Variant 
Modulation 
of free 
parameters – 
Variant 
1 2 3 
0 0 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
1 1 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.10 
 
1 2 0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
1 3 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 	  
1 4 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.10 
 
2 1 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
2 2 0.00 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
2 3 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
2 4 0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.45 
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